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We demonstrate the existence of Gaussian multipartite bound information which is a classical
analog of Gaussian multipartite bound entanglement. We construct a tripartite Gaussian distri-
bution from which no secret key can be distilled, but which cannot be created by local operations
and public communication. Further, we show that the presence of bound information is conditional
on the presence of a part of the adversary’s information creatable only by private communication.
Existence of this part of the adversary’s information is found to be a more generic feature of clas-
sical analogs of quantum phenomena obtained by mapping of non-classically correlated separable
quantum states.
PACS numbers: 03.67.-a, 03.67.Mn, 89.70.-a
Quantum entanglement and secret classical correla-
tions are nonlocal information resources in the sense that
they cannot be created by local operations and classi-
cal communication (LOCC) [1] and local operations and
public communication (LOPC) [2, 3], respectively. The
distillability of these resources is the key prerequisite for
their utility in reliable communication. Indeed, imperfect
entangled states can sometimes be distilled [4] by LOCC
into a maximally entangled singlet state - a perfect re-
source for the faithful transmission of quantum states via
teleportation [5]. Remarkably, there are entangled states
which cannot be distilled to singlet form [6]. These states,
fittingly said to be “bound entangled”, demonstrate a
fundamental property of entanglement, namely its irre-
versibility under LOCC transformations [7]. More pre-
cisely, bound entanglement requires singlets for creation
but no singlets can be distilled from it. Despite being
nondistillable and hence unusable directly for quantum
communication, bound entanglement can be activated
[8, 9] and can contain distillable entanglement when ten-
sored [10] or mixed [11].
Moving to the secret correlations, they appear in the
scenario in which two honest parties, Alice and Bob, and
an adversary Eve, share independent realizations of three
random variables A,B and E, characterized by the prob-
ability distribution P (A,B,E). As with entanglement,
Alice and Bob can sometimes distill them by LOPC to
a secret key, i.e., a common string of random bits about
which Eve has practically no information. Inspired by the
existence of bound entanglement, Gisin and Wolf posed
a question [12] as to whether there are also nondistillable
secret correlations, referred to as bound information (BI),
that act as a classical analogue to bound entanglement.
So far, a bipartite distribution has been found containing
BI only in the asymptotic limit [3], but surprisingly, an
example of tripartite BI was derived in [13]. A proba-
bility distribution P (A,B,C,E) shared by three honest
parties Alice, Bob and Clare, and an adversary Eve, car-
ries tripartite BI if [13]: (i) any pair of honest parties
cannot distill a secret key, even if they can collaborate
with the third party, and (ii) the distribution cannot be
distributed by LOPC, i.e., the reduced probability distri-
bution P (A,B,C) cannot be distributed among the hon-
est parties if their public communication is constrained
to contain at most information of the variable E.
The example of BI from Ref. [13] is discrete. It is
obtained from a specific bound entangled state ρˆABC
of three two-level systems by measuring its purifica-
tion |ψ〉ABCE , ρˆABC = TrE(|ψ〉〈ψ|ABCE), where E la-
bels Eve’s purifying system, with measurements Pˆi, i =
A,B,C,E in the computational basis as [14]
P (A,B,C,E) = Tr(PˆA⊗PˆB⊗PˆC⊗PˆE |ψ〉〈ψ|ABCE). (1)
The distribution contains secret correlations across one
splitting of honest parties into two groups which guaran-
tees that both (i) and (ii) hold. The key step in the con-
struction of BI [13], as well as of other classical analogs
[15, 16] of quantum phenomena, is the proof of the ab-
sence of secret correlations across particular splittings.
The proof is based on the concept of intrinsic informa-
tion which is for the distribution P (A,B,E) defined as
[17]
IAB↓E = min
E→E˜
IAB|E˜ , (2)
where IAB|E˜ is the conditional mutual information and
the minimization is performed over all channels E →
E˜. Importantly, if IAB↓E = 0 then Alice and Bob
do not share secret correlations [3]. In the proofs of
Refs. [13, 15, 16] a suitable channel E → E˜ is found eras-
ing a part of Eve’s information which nullifies the con-
ditional mutual information. The intrinsic information
then vanishes and there are no secret correlations across
the considered splitting. The new variable E˜ represents a
publicly communicated message used by the honest par-
ties for the LOPC preparation of the reduced distribution
of their variables. However, in order to create the entire
considered distribution including the original variable E,
it is desirable to know whether Eve’s part of the infor-
mation, which is erased by the channel E → E˜, can also
2be established by LOPC or whether some other resources
are needed.
In this paper we demonstrate the existence of multi-
partite BI for random Gaussian continuous variables. We
construct a tripartite Gaussian distribution containing
secret correlations across only one splitting which thus
carries tripartite Gaussian bound information (GBI). By
using the Gaussian entanglement criteria [18, 19], we
prove the presence of GBI without using the concept of
intrinsic information. This approach also reveals that the
creation of the part of Eve’s information, which is erased
by the channel E → E˜, requires private communication
between honest parties across the splittings where the
distribution contains no secret correlations. Moreover,
we find that this information is interconnected with the
BI as if it is dropped the BI disappears. Finally, we
give an example of a discrete distribution where creation
of Eve’s information requires private communication and
we argue that a necessary prerequisite for this property is
the mapping of the type (1) of a non-classically correlated
separable quantum state.
Gaussian secret correlations. We consider the set
of Gaussian states and measurements associated with
quantum systems with infinite-dimensional Hilbert state
spaces. N such systems, which can be physically re-
alized by N light modes, are described by N pairs of
position and momentum quadrature operators, labeled
by xˆj and pˆj , respectively, j = 1, 2, . . . , N , satisfying
the canonical commutation rules [xˆj , pˆk] = iδjk. N -
mode quantum states can be represented by the Wigner
function of 2N real variables and Gaussian states pos-
sess a Gaussian Wigner function. Any N -mode Gaus-
sian state ρˆ is therefore fully characterized by a vector
ξ¯ = Tr(ρˆξˆ) of phase-space displacements, where ξˆ =
(xˆ1, . . . , xˆN , pˆ1, . . . , pˆN )
T , and by a covariance matrix
(CM) γ with elements γjk = 2ReTr[ρˆ(ξˆj − ξ¯j)(ξˆk − ξ¯k)].
A Gaussian measurement consists of a set of Gaus-
sian operators obtained by all possible displacements of
a fixed Gaussian state and normalized such that the
completeness relation is satisfied. Incorporating Gaus-
sian measurements and Gaussian states into the map-
ping (1), we can construct Gaussian distributions with
unique cryptographic properties. In the case of a bipar-
tite state ρˆAB the mapping can, e.g., yield a distribution
P (A,B,E) with distillable secret correlations. Necessary
and sufficient conditions for secure-key distillability are
not known, yet nevertheless one can show [20, 21], that
a Gaussian distribution P (A,B,E) is distillable if
max (∆IDR,∆IRR) > 0, (3)
where ∆IDR = IAB − IAE and ∆IRR = IAB − IBE are
differences of mutual information [22], IAB between Alice
and Bob and IAE (IBE) between Alice (Bob) and Eve.
The mapping of entanglement onto distillable secret
correlations is best exemplified by the two-mode squeezed
vacuum state. It is a Gaussian entangled state |τ(m)〉AB
of two modes A and B described by the CM τAB(m) =
ωAB(m)⊕ [ωAB(m)]−1 with
[ωAB(m)]ij =
√
m2 + δij − 1, i, j = 1, 2, (4)
where m = cosh(2r) (r > 0 is the squeezing parameter).
By measuring the position quadratures on modes A and
B (with outcomes xA and xB) the state is mapped onto
the Gaussian distribution
PAB(xA, xB) = (pi)
−1e
−(xA,xB)[ωAB(m)]
−1
(
xA
xB
)
, (5)
for which IAB = log2 [cosh (2r)]. As the state itself is
pure, Eve is completely uncorrelated with Alice and Bob.
Consequently, IAE = IBE = 0 and the global distribu-
tion contains distillable secret correlations according to
the criterion (3). A closer look at the distribution fur-
ther shows that it plays the role of a continuous-variable
analog of a basic unit of discrete secret correlations, a
secret bit [14], defined as a probability distribution sat-
isfying P (A,B,E) = P (A,B)P (E) and P (A = B) = 1.
Indeed, not only does the distribution satisfy the first
condition, but it also approaches the continuous-variable
analog PAB(xA, xB) ∝ δ(xA − xB) of the second condi-
tion with increasing r.
Construction of GBI. We construct GBI by mapping
of a bound entangled Gaussian state of three modes A,B
and C with the CM given in Eq. (17) of Ref. [23]. To con-
struct GBI from the state we need to find its purification.
The separability criterion [18] reveals that the state can
be decomposed into the product |τ [cosh(2r)]〉AC |0〉B of
the two-mode squeezed vacuum state in modes A and C,
and the vacuum state |0〉B in mode B, and displacements
xˆα → xˆ′α = xˆα + αxqx, (6)
pˆα → pˆ′α = pˆα + αpqp, α = A,B,C, (7)
where −Ax = Cx = Ap = Cp = −1/2, Bx = Bp = 1.
The classical displacements qx and qp obey a Gaus-
sian distribution P(qx, qp) = exp[−(q2x+q2p)/(4x)]/(4pix),
where x = (e2r − 1)/2. Hence, we construct a suitable
purification as
|ψ〉ABCE =
∫ √
P(qx, qp)DˆA (δA) DˆC (δC) |τ(m)〉AC
DˆB (δB) |0〉B |qx〉(x)E1 |qp〉
(p)
E2
dqxdqp, (8)
where | . 〉(x) (| . 〉(p)) is a position (momentum) eigen-
state, m = cosh(2r) and Dˆα (δα) = exp(δαaˆ
†
α − δ∗αaˆα) is
the displacement operator with δα = (αxqx+ iαpqp)/
√
2.
The purification (8) has the CM Γ = X ⊕ (X)−1, where
X =


a 2x b 2x 12
2x c −2x 4x −e2r
b −2x a −2x e2r − 12
2x 4x −2x 4x −2x
1
2 −e2r e2r − 12 −2x y

 (9)
with a = cosh(2r) + x, b = sinh(2r) − x, c = 1 + 4x
and y = e2r
(
2e2r − 1) / [2 (e2r − 1)]. By measuring the
3position quadratures on all modes of the purification we
get a Gaussian distribution
Π (η) = (pi)−
5
2 e−η
T (X)−1η, (10)
where η = (xA, xB, xC , xE1 , xE2)
T is the vector of mea-
surement outcomes and X is the classical covariance ma-
trix (CCM) (9). The distribution contains secret corre-
lations across just one splitting and therefore contains
multipartite GBI.
First we prove the absence of secret correlations across
the B−(AC) splitting. Assume Alice and Clare privately
draw two random variables zA and zC from a Gaussian
distribution with CCM ωAC [cosh(2r)], Eq. (4). They also
draw a third variable xE1 from a Gaussian distribution
with variance 〈x2E1〉 = 2x and send it through a public
channel to Bob. He privately generates a random variable
zB obeying a Gaussian distribution with variance 〈z2B〉 =
1/2. Alice, Bob and Clare displace their variables as
in Eq. (6), where we have performed the replacements
xˆα(xˆ
′
α) → zα(xα), qx → xE1 . The variables xA, xB and
xC obey the reduced distribution Π(xA, xB , xC). As the
distribution was created by the public communication of
xE1 across the B − (AC) splitting, the distribution (10)
indeed contains no secret correlations across the splitting.
Similarly we can show that there are no secret corre-
lations across the C − (AB) splitting. For this we again
use the separability criterion [18] and decompose the un-
derlying state into the product |τ(m)〉AB |0〉C , where
m =
1 + 2(e4r − e2r)
2e2r − 1 , (11)
and the displacements (6) and (7) with Ax = −Ap =
1/(2y), Bx = Bp = −e2r/y, Cx = Cp = (1 − e−2r),
and the displacements qx and qp obeying the Gaussian
distribution P˜(qx, qp) = exp[−
(
q2x + q
2
p
)
/y]/(piy). The
decomposition tells us how to establish the reduced dis-
tribution Π(xA, xB , xC) by LOPC with respect to the
C − (AB) splitting. Initially, Alice and Bob draw pri-
vately two random variables zA and zB from a Gaus-
sian distribution with CCM ωAB(m), Eq. (4), where
m is given in Eq. (11), and Clare privately generates
a random variable zC obeying a Gaussian distribution
with variance 〈z2C〉 = 1/2. Alice and Bob also draw
a third variable xE2 from a Gaussian distribution with
variance 〈x2E2〉 = y/2 and send it to Clare through a
public channel. All the participants then perform dis-
placements (6), where we have performed the replace-
ments xˆα(xˆ
′
α) → zα(xα), qx → xE2 , and the coefficients
αx are given below Eq. (11). The variables xA, xB and
xC follow the reduced distribution Π(xA, xB , xC), which
we distributed by the public communication of xE2 across
the C − (AB) splitting. Consequently, the distribution
(10) contains no secret correlations across the splitting.
Activating GBI. As the distribution (10) contains no
secret correlations across the B − (AC) and C − (AB)
splittings, no two honest parties can establish a secret
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FIG. 1: Information differences ∆IRR (solid curve) in
Eq. (12); ∆I ′RR (dotted curve) and ∆I
′
DR (dashed curve) for
CCM (9) with respect to A− (BC) splitting.
key even with the help of the third one. The distribu-
tion, however, cannot be created by LOPC as it con-
tains secret correlations across the A − (BC) splitting.
They are not detected by the criterion (3) (see dotted
and dashed curves in Fig. 1) but can be “activated” by
allowing Bob and Clare to perform the joint operation
xB,C → (xB ± xC) /
√
2. The presence of secret correla-
tions can be seen from the reduced distribution of Alice’s,
Bob’s and Eve’s variables. The corresponding informa-
tion difference ∆IRR arising in the condition (3) then can
be expressed as
log2
√
4− e−2r − 11e2r + 20e4r − 20e6r + 16e8r
2− 8e2r + 10e6r + 4e8r (12)
and it is plotted against the squeezing parameter r in
Fig. 1. The figure and numerics reveal, that ∆IRR > 0 for
r > r∆IRR=0
.
= 0.166. Therefore Alice and Bob can distill
a secret key using the reverse reconciliation protocol [24].
This would be impossible without the distribution (10)
to have secret correlations across the A− (BC) splitting
which accomplishes the construction of GBI.
Specific adversary features. The absence of secret cor-
relations could be alternatively proved using the intrinsic
information (2). If Eve uses the channel (xE1 , xE2) →
xE1(xE2), we get IB(AC)|E1 = 0 (IC(AB)|E2 = 0). Then
IB(AC)↓E1E2 = 0 (IC(AB)↓E1E2 = 0) follows and the
distribution (10) contains no secret correlations across
B − (AC) (C − (AB)) splitting. It is, however, advan-
tageous to use the formalism of our previous proof as it
unveils the nonlocal nature of the part of Eve’s informa-
tion which is erased by the channel, and its interconnec-
tion with the BI carried by the distribution (10). More
precisely, it shows first, that for r > r˜
.
= 0.284 both
of Eve’s variables are indispensable for the presence of
the BI as dropping either of them results in its disap-
pearance. Indeed, the dropping of xE1 causes the distri-
bution Π(xA, xB, xE2) to give ∆IDR > 0 for r > 0.156
and the secret key can be distilled between Alice and
Bob. Likewise, if xE2 is dropped and r > r˜, Alice and
Clare can distill a secret key with the help of Bob (See
4Appendix A for the proof). In the remaining interval
r˜ ≥ r > r∆IRR=0 the condition (3) is not fulfilled if xE2
is discarded and we cannot decide about the presence of
BI. Nevertheless, Alice and Bob can create a new vari-
able xA−xB/2 which, together with the variables xC and
xE1 , obeys a distribution satisfying ∆IDR > 0 for r > 0.
Consequently, after discarding xE2 from the distribution
(10) secret correlations across both the A − (BC) and
C − (AB) splittings are present and the property (i) of
BI is no longer guaranteed.
Let us now focus on the remaining variable xE2 (xE1)
which is erased in the proof of the absence of secret cor-
relations across the B− (AC) (C − (AB)) splitting. Can
honest parties also publicly announce this variable by us-
ing only LOPC across the splitting? If this was the case
then it would be possible to create the distribution with
GBI (10) just from secret correlations with respect to the
A−C or A−B splitting in the form of the distribution
(5). Surprisingly, we answer the question in the negative.
Namely, the variable can be expressed as
xEj = −ApzA −BpzB − CpzC + exEk + χEj , (13)
where j = 2, k = 1 (j = 1, k = 2) and
e = (−1/2)(AxAp + BxBp + CxCp). The parameters
Ax,p, Bx,p, Cx,p are given below Eq. (7) (Eq. (11)), and
the random variable χE2 (χE1) is uncorrelated with the
other variables and obeys a Gaussian distribution with
variance 〈χ2E2〉 = 1/(8x) (〈χ2E1〉 = 1/(2y)). The variable
(13) contains the term ApzA + BpzB + CpzC involving
variables belonging to both parts of the B − (AC) (C −
(AB)) splitting. Assume, that the variable xE2 (xE1)
is known publicly and the parties share the reduced dis-
tribution Π(xA, xB , xC , xE1) (Π(xA, xB, xC , xE2)), which
can be completely created by LOPC across the splitting.
The honest parties can then turn the “nonlocal” term
into (distillable) secret correlations by combining locally
with respect to the B − (AC) (C − (AB)) splitting the
variable xE2 (xE1) with their variables (See Appendix B
for the proof). As it is impossible to create secret cor-
relations by LOPC the variable xE2 (xE1) cannot be an-
nounced publicly by LOPC and private communication
across the B − (AC) (C − (AB)) splitting is needed for
this task.
We have shown for the distribution (10), that although
it does not contain secret correlations across a certain
splitting, the creation of the whole of Eve’s information
requires private communication across the splitting. This
property obviously cannot be obtained by mapping of the
type (1) of pure states or classically correlated separable
states, which are diagonal in the local product basis [26]
and product in the Gaussian scenario [27], but one can
get it by mapping of some non-classically correlated sep-
arable states which is the case of the state used for con-
struction of GBI. Interestingly, one can find the property
also for some other probability distributions constructed
via the mapping of such a state. For example, for the dis-
crete probability distribution (8) from Ref. [15] derived
from a fully separable state [28] exhibiting non-classical
correlations [29], Alice and Bob do not share secret cor-
relations. However, to create the distribution Alice and
Bob have to reveal to Eve, i.e., publicly announce, the
results of privately tossed, independent fair coins, but
only if the results differ. In those cases for which Alice
and Bob do not share their results with Eve, i.e., their
results are the same, a shared secret bit is established be-
tween them. This is clearly impossible with LOPC and a
private channel is required to decide when to share their
results with Eve.
Conclusions. We derived a distribution carrying tri-
partite GBI. The entire distribution cannot be con-
structed by LOPC solely from secret correlations shared
by a certain pair of honest parties because the creation
of a part of Eve’s information requires private communi-
cation with the third honest party. Moreover, this part
of Eve’s information is found to be inextricably intercon-
nected with the presence of the BI. As a similar nonlocal
part of Eve’s information can also be traced for some
other classical analogs of quantum phenomena, an open
question arises about to which extent the interconnec-
tion between this information and the presence of the
phenomenon is general. Our results reveal the nontriv-
ial nature of the classical information resources needed
for formation of some classical analogs of quantum phe-
nomena and show that they are linked to the quantum
resources not only in the form of entanglement but also
in the form of separable non-classical correlations.
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Appendix A: Indispensability of the variable xE2 for
the presence of bound information
In this appendix we show that if the variable xE2 is
dropped from the distribution (10) and r > r˜
.
= 0.284,
Alice and Clare can distill a secret key with the help of
Bob. Indeed, if Bob publicly communicates his variable
xB to Alice and Clare, they can create new variables xA+
gxB and xC + hxB . The distribution of these variables
and the variables xB and xE1 held by Eve, where g and h
are chosen such that ∆IDR is maximized, gives ∆IDR > 0
for r > r˜
.
= 0.284. Consequently, Alice and Clare can
distill a secret key with the help of Bob.
Appendix B: Secret correlations appear if the erased
adversary’s information is known publicly
In this appendix we prove, that if the par-
ties share the reduced distribution Π(xA, xB, xC , xE1)
(Π(xA, xB , xC , xE2)) and the variable xE2 (xE1) is pub-
licly known, then the honest parties share secret correla-
tions across the B − (AC) (C − (AB)) splitting.
5Assume first, that all the participants hold the pub-
licly known variable xE2 and they also hold the reduced
distribution Π(xA, xB , xC , xE1). Then Alice and Clare
can create a new variable x′A = (xA + xC)/2− xE2 . The
joint distribution of the variables x′A, xB, xE1 and xE2
then satisfies ∆IDR > 0 if r > r
′ .= 0.38 and therefore
contains (distillable) secret correlations with respect to
the A−B splitting according to the criterion (3). If, on
the other hand, the honest parties create new variables
x′′A = (xA + xC)/2 and x
′′
B = xB + xE2 , the distribution
of the variables x′′A, x
′′
B , xE1 and xE2 yields ∆IDR > 0
for r < r′′
.
= 0.549 and consequently there are (distill-
able) secret correlations with respect to the same split-
ting also for r ≤ r′. As the latter secret correlations
have been established by local operations with respect to
the B − (AC) splitting which cannot create secret cor-
relations, we have to conclude, that if the parties share
the distribution Π(xA, xB, xC , xE1) and know the vari-
able xE2 , then the honest parties share secret correlations
across the B − (AC) splitting.
Assume now, that the parties share the reduced distri-
bution Π(xA, xB, xC , xE2) and the publicly known vari-
able xE1 . They can then prepare new variables x¯A =
e2rxA + xB/2 and x¯C = xC + ye
−2rxE1 which together
with the variables xE1 and xE2 obey a distribution sat-
isfying ∆IDR > 0 for r > 0 across the A − C splitting.
Because the latter secret correlations have been created
by local operations with respect to C − (AB) splitting
which cannot create secret correlations, there are secret
correlations across the C − (AB) splitting if the parties
share the distribution Π(xA, xB , xC , xE2) and know the
variable xE1 .
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